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This paper argues that a new concept, summarized as ‘CHESS’, should be used in the chemical 
industry to further substantially advance safety (where we use the term in a broad sense, that is, 
safety and  physical security, amongst others). The different domains that need to be focused upon, 
and where innovative initiatives should be taken are Cluster-thinking and cooperation, High 
transparency and efficient inspections, Education and training, Security integration, and Safety 
innovation. Since society has fundamentally changed over the last two decades, and ever more 
hazardous materials are used in chemical sites which are ever more closely situated next to highly-
populated areas, revolutionizing safety via the CHESS concept is truly needed in the very near 
future, both from a safety and a security point of view. 
Keywords: Safety history; Safety revolutions; Physical security; Safety innovation; Chemical 
industry 
1.   Introduction 
Based on available literature, it is very difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions about the 
increase or decline in the number of accidents – occupational accidents and/or process safety 
accidents – in the chemical and process industries over the past decades. Nonetheless, it goes 
without any doubt that still too many accidents do happen in the industry (on average more than 
three major accidents annually). According to Mihailidou et al. (2012), who investigated 319 
major industrial accidents in the chemical industry since 1917, the “number of major accidents is 
generally decreasing”, but other authors claim differently (see e.g. Kirchsteiger, 1999; Pasman, 
2016). Le Coze (2013) for instance describes similar accidents repeating themselves after 20-30 
years around the 21st century. In any case, in total some 25,000 fatalities have resulted from major 
accidents since 1917, in which a major accident was defined by at least one of the following 
criteria (Mihailidou et al., 2012): 
• 25 fatalities or more 
• 125 injuries or more 
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• 10,000 evacuated or more 
• 10,000 people or more deprived of water 
• Excluded are: oil spills at sea; mining accidents; security accidents (with intention). 
Besides major accidents, many occupational accidents happened in the chemical industry since the 
beginning of the 20th century. Nonetheless, in general, despite lacking aggregated figures, we may 
assume that, due to safety efforts and safety improvements of different kinds during the past 
decades, a decreasing trend in the occupational accidents of  many chemical and process 
companies is present. Analyzing accident statistics as per industry type, it is well evident that there 
is a significant decline in accident per industry (or fatality per industry), which is still, surprisingly, 
way beyond public acceptance due to higher social responsibility and lower tolerance of 
incremental risk; this all urges a higher pressure to enhance safety. 
 
Fig. 1. Trend of the fatalities caused by major hazard incident data service accidents (MHIDAS, 2003): adopted from 
Paltrinieri and Khan (2016). 
However, major accidents do keep happening at a steady pace (see e.g., Kirchsteiger, 1999; 
Pasman, 2016). Moreover, if only occupational accidents are taken into account, in industrial 
practice a certain threshold of the number of such accidents can be observed below which it is very 
hard for companies to reach. Aside from major accidents, rare accidents are usually characterized 
by rarity, severity, surprise, and high degrees of uncertainty. According to the nonlinear nature of 
rare events, small variations in causal factors can result in large deviances in severity of 
consequences (Bier et al., 1999). For example, consider domino effects in process plants when a 
primary fire or explosion in a unit can propagate to other neighboring units, triggering secondary 
fires and explosions whose extent and severity could hardly have been imagined. Bier et al. (1999) 
classify rare events into unexpected and counter-expected events. The former class refers to events 
that have never occurred in the past (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001) and thus 
cannot be imagined and predicted whereas the latter class addresses those events that can be 
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imagined but due to their very low probabilities are considered impossible and are advertently 
ignored (e.g., the Japan triple disaster, March 2011). In recent years, the terms black swan and 
grey swan have been frequently used to address rare events that are quite unpredictable and 
predictable but with larger uncertainties, respectively (Taleb, 2007a,b; Aven, 2013). 
Other authors (Knegtering and Pasman, 2009; Reniers and Amyotte, 2012) have also indicated the 
need for, and some pathways towards, safety improvements in the future chemical industry. 
Hence, the ‘business-as-usual’ approach for dealing with occupational safety as well as process 
safety in the chemical industry seems to be insufficient to truly advance safety. Actually, a 
paradigm shift is needed.  
Such a paradigm shift should indeed provide an answer to our changing society with its own 
specific needs and societal expectations, including, for instance, more transparency and the 
inclusion of economic, moral and ethical aspects in risk assessments. In this regard, the increasing 
trend of new security challenges such as terrorist attacks not only throughout the world but also to 
the chemical industry should also not be overlooked. The recent intentional attacks to two 
chemical plants in France in June and July of 2015 (BBC news, 2015a,b) raised the flag about the 
imminent risk of security events in the chemical industry. Some other observations are that despite 
too many incidents and accidents in the chemical industry, (i) the chemical industry does not seem 
to really have learned from these accidents since still a majority of approaches toward safety are 
reactive and not proactive, and (ii) chemical companies in industrial areas (chemical industrial 
parks) are still dealing with safety issues (let alone the security issues) too individually, that is, 
from a “safety islands” perspective instead of a “safety clusters” viewpoint. 
As for the paradigm shift, the following questions may be formulated: 
• How to integrate different types of risks (e.g., domino effects, land-use-planning, natech 
accidents, and security risks) when making risk decisions?  
• How to deal with horror scenarios (e.g. terrorism) from a sustainable viewpoint? 
• How to consider moral aspects in decision-making?  
• How to develop usable and inclusive dynamic risk assessment techniques, using big data 
and real-time monitoring? 
• How to advance academic knowledge regarding physical- and cyber security? 
• How to truly advance collaboration and cluster-thinking? 
• How to innovate safety within the chemical industry in a sustainable way, whereby the 
energy transition, land-use planning, safety behavior, etc. are all considered? 
• How to initiate and advance strategic proactive and reactive collaboration in chemical 
clusters?  
• How to increase people knowledge about safety, or e.g., how to encourage students to 
pursue majors in chemical process safety and security? 
Despite the evolution of safety over the past century which is based on Swuste et al. (2010), 
Swuste et al. (2014), Swuste et al. (2016a), and Oostendorp et al. (2016) (see Figure 2), no answers 
have been formulated so far for these questions. Hence, current approaches and contemporary 
thinking, mental models, technological approaches and solutions, safety implementations and 
(evolutionary) ways to improve safety are regretfully not sufficient either to answer these 
questions or to revolutionize safety and thus making it much safer in a realistic and achievable 
way. Therefore, a safety revolution is needed in the chemical industry. 
G. Reniers, N. Khakzad / Journal of Integrated Security Science 2017 (1) 2-15    5 
 
In fact, two safety revolutions already took place (Figure 2): (i) the ‘safety first movement’ (1900s 
until 1950s) represents the first safety revolution, and (ii) the ‘risk management and loss 
prevention’ approaches (1960s until 2010s) denote the era of the second safety revolution. The 
third safety revolution which is desperately needed today to further advance safety in the chemical 
industry can be summarized by the acronym ‘CHESS’ (from 2020s onwards). Figure 2 shows the 
three safety revolutions along with the underlying theories, models, concepts and ideas per decade. 
 
Fig. 2. Safety progress and the three safety revolutions in the chemical industry (1900-2030 and future). 
The present study is aimed at identifying the characteristics of the third safety revolution and 
setting guidelines as to how to transition from the current safety era to the next one (where 
amongst others the importance of physical security is acknowledged and fully integrated with 
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safety policies and management). Section 2 discusses the evolutionary trends currently being 
practiced within industrial safety and security research in academic institutions. Section 3 further 
elaborates and explains the CHESS concept representing the needs for the third safety revolution 
in the chemical industry. Conclusions and further recommendations are presented in Section 4. 
2.   Current evolutionary trends to improve safety (and security) in the chemical industry 
The number of safety-related tasks in any organization is huge, so are the responsibilities 
accompanying the decisions and choices that have to be made. Well-known (technical) aspects of 
safety assessment and management in companies, that is, hazard identification, scenario modeling, 
and risk analysis and assessment, are only one part of the larger domain of dealing with risks 
undertaken by company safety managers. Other elements include but are not limited to safety 
training and education, training-on-the-job, management by walking around, emergency response 
and planning, business continuity planning, ethical aspects of safety, reliability engineering, 
learning from incidents, risk communication, risk perception, psycho-social aspects of risk, 
economic aspects of safety, risk governance, and many more. Meyer and Reniers (2016) define 
operational risk management as “the systematic application of management policies, procedures 
and practices to the tasks of identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating and monitoring risks”. 
Figure 3 illustrates the very broad and challenging operational risk management set. Safety 
managers nowadays realize that this set represents their package of responsibilities. From a rather 
very technical approach, safety management has expanded towards an approach encompassing all 
these other domains, to a lesser or higher extent.  
Furthermore, the scientific background and the disciplines needed to tackle the different domains 
and items in the risk management set are ever more diverse. Safety- and risk management are no 
longer the exclusive terrain of engineers, physicians, and safety scientists; in fact, sciences such as 
psychology, sociology, pure mathematics, chemistry and physics, philosophy, economists, 
communication, business and management, criminology, and law are also effectively involved in 
safety improvement these days. 
Employing the well-known bow-tie concept (Figure 4) to explain the evolutionary trends taking 
place in safety improvement in the chemical industry, three areas may be discerned: the proactive 
phase (pre-incident), the incident phase, and the reactive phase (post-incident). In the proactive 
phase, a variety of trends can be observed and discussed. The first trend is that there is ever more 
cooperation between companies, however, mainly on an operational level and mostly concerning 
reactive issues such as accident investigation and evacuation exercises (Reniers and Cozzani, 
2013). More collaboration among companies and academia and authorities can also be seen. The 
second trend is concerned with making risk assessments less static and more dynamic (Paltrinieri 
and Khan, 2016). Dynamic risk analyses include advanced mathematical-based techniques being 
developed in the academia including Markov chains (Shu and Zhao, 2014), Event sequence 
diagrams (Zhou et al., 2016), Petri-nets (Zhou and Reniers, 2016a,b,c), and Bayesian Networks 
(Khakzad et al., 2016; Khakzad, 2015; Khakzad and Reniers, 2016; Khakzad and Reniers, 2015a). 
Furthermore, operational economics including cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis 
are improved and employed with an increasing trend (Reniers and van Erp, 2016; Reniers and 
Sorensen, 2013; Reniers and Brijs, 2014). Some specialized topics have also been explored, 
introduced and developed in chemical corporations, such as security risk analyses (Khakzad and 
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Reniers, 2015b; Reniers and Audenaert, 2014), performance management science (Swuste et al., 
2016b), mental models and moral or ethical principles for calculating risks (Reniers and van Erp, 
2016). The attention for systemic risks, whereby one looks at the whole system rather than 
(analytically) looking at its parts, leads to the taking of safety barriers at a systemic level. An 
example is that one looks at a whole chemical plant at once instead of merely considering  its 
installations or equipment (Reniers et al., 2012; Reniers et al., 2014). Besides, a variety of 
scientific disciplines (cfr. also Figure 3) are employed to invent trans-disciplinary solutions. All 
kinds of safety apps can further be expected to lead to optimized communication and perhaps 
much better safety decision-making. Innovation with respect to the so-called ‘safety culture’, via, 
for example, High Reliability Organization principles (Meyer and Reniers, 2016) or newly 
developed leadership styles such as Total Respect Management (Blokland and Reniers, 2013) are 
also being elaborated. 
 
Fig. 3. The operational risk management set (based on Meyer and Reniers (2016). 
 
Fig. 4. Bow-tie concept with three phases: proactive, incident, and reactive. 
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In the incident phase, also several evolutionary trends can be observed. Real-time data and big 
data, as well as all progress in communication devices and possibilities have led to better and more 
objective risk assessments and decisions, as well as regulations such as Land-use Planning 
(Pasman and Reniers, 2014). Large-scale simulation exercises of disasters are made more real 
while serious games to exercise incident-phase decisions and tasks are elaborated. Collaboration 
between different actors in the incident phase is also improved with more involvement from the 
public and the authorities.  
During the aftermath of an incident, an important evolutionary trend of improvement concerns 
better collaboration among rescue workers, fire-fighters, industrial practitioners, medical services, 
logistics services, communication experts, and academics. Moreover,  the use of innovative 
technology (e.g., drones), certain human aspects (e.g., trauma-psychological aspects), and 
organizational structures to deal with problems in a post-incident phase are trends that cannot be 
disregarded.  
Obviously, most progress is currently made in the proactive phase. The incident and certainly the 
after-incident phases are, however, less focused upon in current time, probably since they have a 
much longer history of interest by researchers in the past decades. 
3.   Revolutionizing safety: The CHESS concept 
The previous section provided the evolutionary trends which can be discerned in current academic 
research and industrial practice. However, these trends represent thinking ‘within the box’, and are 
usually “more of the same concept/approach” or, at best, incremental improvements and 
optimization of existing technology, management practices, organizational arrangements, and 
human factors. To truly advance safety within the chemical industry, we need to think ‘out of the 
box’, and another revolution such as “the safety first movement” or “risk management and loss 
prevention” is necessary. But what should such a revolution contain, and who could realize it?  
Revolutions start with radically new ideas, and not with ‘old wine in new barrels’ or ‘new wine in 
old barrels’. These new ideas are formed via mental models, the willingness to change things, and 
the understanding that changing things will lead to a better/improved situation, which in turn will 
result in the profitability and license-to-operate of chemical plants. Such should be the case with 
this third safety revolution in the chemical industrial sector.  
We believe that the third safety revolution can be represented by the acronym ‘CHESS’. CHESS 
in fact summarizes 5 very important fields where revolutionary progress is needed: 
• Cluster-thinking and intensified cooperation 
• High transparency and efficient inspection 
• Education, training and learning 
• Security integration 
• Safety innovation and dynamic risk assessments 
At first sight, these fields represent well-known recipes for improving safety in any industry 
whereas they are nothing new. However, one should realize that the combination of these domains 
could indeed lead to a third safety revolution in the chemical industry if they would be addressed 
in radical innovative ways. The required innovation can be exemplified by a number of concrete 
ideas, which can only be realized if current mentality of practitioners, academics and authorities 
changes. 
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3.1.   Cluster thinking and intensified cooperation 
For the first revolutionary field, cluster-thinking and collaboration intensification, some thorough 
research has already been done (Reniers, 2010; Reniers, 2013; Reniers and Pavlova, 2013). 
Cooperation on a proactive and strategic level such as joint emergency management strategies and 
decision making tools, besides reactive and operational level cooperation such as joint evacuation 
drills, should form the backbone of the third safety revolution. Some chemical industrial parks 
have already started working together so as to strategically improve horizontal logistics, the use of 
energy (or utilities in general), or environmental issues (e.g. waste streams); however, they usually 
fail to collaborate more intensively with respect to proactively and strategically enhancing safety. 
The following innovative approaches can  be considered: 
• Establish a multi-plant council or a cluster council (see e.g. Reniers, 2010) 
• Establish proactive strategic cooperation and improvement by setting up a ‘cluster safety 
funding’ budget (see e.g. Reniers and Pavlova, 2013) 
• Use ‘flying risk assessment’ teams and ‘flying internal audit’ teams in clusters 
• Establish a cluster emergency planning matrix (see e.g. Reniers and Faes, 2013) 
• Take various forms of risks such as domino effects (escalating accidents) and natech 
accidents into account in risk assessments 
• Establish a cluster safety management system upgrade approach (see e.g. Reniers, 2010) 
• Establish a ‘cluster safety culture’ (see e.g. Reniers, 2010; Reniers, 2013) 
3.2.   High transparency and efficient inspection 
The second revolutionary field, high transparency and more efficient inspection, has already 
inspired the aviation sector. In this sector, a mature system of procedures and agreements is 
worked out to deal with the reporting of all incidents and near-misses in order to learn as much as 
possible in a ‘just culture’ setting (Dekker, 2012).  
Accordingly, the following innovative approaches can be introduced and elaborated in the 
chemical industry worldwide: 
• Establish a national database to report all types of incidents and accidents by chemical 
companies (see e.g. Meel et al., 2007) 
• Establish a ‘just culture’ in chemical plants/clusters (see e.g. Dekker, 2012) 
• Establish a dissemination system where companies and authorities/inspection teams can 
learn from all incidents happening within the industry 
• Establish an understanding between cluster safety council members and inspection 
services to make inspections more efficient 
• Use drones to continuously gather data from around the cluster 
Besides efficiency improvements, inspections should evidently also be more effective. Often, the 
quality of inspections is below a level that might be expected in case of chemical industrial 
activities. Besides operating plant personnel, inspectors from the authorities should therefore also 
be well-educated (cfr. also Section 3.3), and physical and cyber security issues should be 
inspected, in one go with safety inspections of installations. 
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3.3.   Education, training and learning 
The third revolutionary field, dealing with safety education, learning and training, also deserves 
dedicated attention. One not only needs to learn not only from near misses and incidents but also 
from safety models, theories and knowledge in general. Here lies also a task for society: there 
should be courses on ‘dealing with risk and uncertainty’, or ‘operational safety’, starting from 
primary school education. If people get familiar with safety from very early ages, they can learn 
much more in higher education. Moreover, it can be expected that the much more thorough safety 
knowledge of all people through regular education will be used in daily life and business to make 
better decisions and reduce losses, both on private-and public working levels.  
In this regard, the following innovations can be suggested: 
• Knowledge management systems should be present in every chemical plant 
• There should be training sessions where plant safety managers and safety inspection 
services are jointly present 
• Safety learning should be supported by adequate/validated/scientifically investigated 
performance management science 
• ‘Basic knowledge of valuing and prioritizing safety’ should be taught to children in 
primary schools 
• ‘Risk management and risk-based decision making’ should be taught at high schools and 
universities, either as a separate course, or within existing courses 
• ‘Process safety’ (and inherent safety) should be taught to all chemists, chemical engineers 
and industrial engineers, and be considered essential in the educational program 
3.4.   Security integration 
The fourth revolutionary field, security integration, mainly concerns more effective counter-
terrorism security practices in the chemical industry. At present, security efforts in chemical plants 
are aimed at low-impact high-frequency security risks (Reniers, 2012; Reniers, 2011) such as 
burglary and sabotage, or, at best, would-be (or tourist) terrorists. However, an adequate upgrade is 
needed towards anti-terrorist security measures (Landucci et al., 2015; Zhang and Reniers, 2016). 
But more in general, security should be treated in an integrated way with safety by company safety 
management. Safety and security both concern the avoidance and mitigation of losses of different 
origins (safety looks at possible unintentionally caused losses while security is about tackling 
deliberately caused losses).  
Some innovative ways to improve this domain are: 
• Carry out threat assessments, security vulnerability assessments or, in general, security 
risk assessments in all chemical plants/clusters (alongside safety risk assessments, and in 
an integrated manner) 
• Use a cluster view in addition to a plant view in order to take counter-terrorism measures,  
• Make a priority of hazmat transportation security (transportation risk assessments and 
measures based on these assessments, secure lanes, secure emplacements) within a 
chemical industrial area 
• Establish cluster security teams (cfr. also section 3.1) 
• Develop a security incident database (cfr. also section 3.2) 
• Establish security inspections for chemical plants/clusters (alongside safety inspections) 
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• Take counter-terrorism measures seriously, preferably design-based by scientific studies 
3.5.   Safety innovation and dynamic risk assessments 
The fifth revolutionary field, i.e., safety innovation and dynamic risk assessments, builds on the 
evolutionary trends of the previous section and is therefore the most evident field to work on. This 
field requires the least change in the mentality of practitioners, academics and authorities. 
Nonetheless, due to the fact that it is the most demanding field from a technological perspective, it 
is the highest hanging fruit. During the past decade, the attempts in the field of dynamic risk 
assessment have been made to address factors such as dynamic procedures for atypical scenario 
identification (including black swan and grey swan events), dynamic hazard identification (as a 
substitute for conventional static techniques such as FMEA, HAZOP, etc.), reactive and proactive 
approaches for probability updating using leading and lagging risk indicators, which in turn would 
result in a more effective uncertainty modeling, dynamic consequence analysis so as to consider 
temporal variations of contributing parameters such as vulnerability, economic conditions, etc., 
and dynamic risk management (for a detail discussion see Paltrinieri and Khan, 2016). 
Despite remarkable innovations in the field of quantitative risk analysis (QRA) as a tool to 
improve safety, design, licensing, and operational processes, still methods for uncertainty handling 
and, more importantly, validation and verification of QRA results are lacking. Thus, one of the 
main issues as for safety innovation could be developing techniques to verify and validate risk 
analysis in parallel with developing techniques for safety improvement and uncertainty handling. It 
is thus crucial to investigate which theoretical views on validity and validation of QRA can be 
found, which features of QRA are useful to validate, and which frameworks can be proposed for 
this purpose, what kinds of claims are made about QRA, and what evidence is available for QRA 
being valid for the stated purposes.  
Some innovations that, if applied together, would make this evolutionary trend a true revolutionary 
field, are as follows: 
• Use big data and the Internet of Things to innovate risk knowledge and safety decision-
making within chemical plants and chemical clusters 
• Use dynamic risk assessment techniques (make large investments in their development 
and on-site application) to advance real-time knowledge and decision-making 
• Invest in research for performance management science and safety/security performance 
indicators (should mainly be proactive) to see which indicators work and which don’t 
(this requires large-scale longitudinal studies) 
• Serious games for a large variety of safety and security major accident/terrorist attack 
scenarios should be developed and used for learning and exercising 
• Science with respect to leadership,  required mental models of employees, and the impact 
on safety should be developed and implemented in chemical plants and  clusters 
• Develop alternative risk assessment techniques whereby both ethical/moral principles and 
economic information are considered 
4.   Conclusions and recommendations 
Achieving a paradigm shift for safety in the chemical industry, leading to a third safety revolution 
in the chemical industry, will be very challenging and ambitious for all stakeholders, yet it is 
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achievable in industrial practice and in the long term will be very rewarding for safety and 
company profitability.  
Such a third safety revolution would undoubtedly lead to an improved acceptability and 
acceptance of chemical risks in current society that is ever more risk averse and demanding for 
more transparency and more communication.  
A strong competitive advantage for chemical clusters that would act as first-movers could 
probably be created, providing opportunities for large-scale investments in their industrial 
activities.  
The third safety revolution can be achieved via five revolutionary fields denoted by acronym 
‘CHESS’: Cluster-thinking and cooperation, High transparency and efficient inspections, 
Education, Security integration, and Safety innovation. 
These revolutionary fields can truly and in a sustainable way change the safety landscape within 
the chemical and process industry. The most achievable revolutionary field is the cluster-thinking, 
that will also deliver the highest safety improvement. Nevertheless, all five mentioned fields 
should be taken up and considered to gain a third safety revolution. 
Finally, better safety will also further reduce environmental risk and would give a new impetus in 
terms of sustainability of chemical industrial activities. In brief, bringing the CHESS concept into 
practice would bring the vision of resilient chemical industrial parks, encompassing the whole 
chain of activities of plant and cluster design, construction, commissioning, operation, and finally 
decommissioning, also in a sustainable sense. 
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